ProtocolsProtocol

TLS 1.3

Standardization progress of post-quantum key exchange and signatures in TLS 1.3.

Identifiers

IdentifierKindUses
Hybrid key exchange
X25519MLKEM768NamedGroupML-KEM-768
SecP256r1MLKEM768NamedGroupML-KEM-768
SecP384r1MLKEM1024NamedGroupML-KEM-1024
Additional hybrid groups
MLKEM1024X448NamedGroupML-KEM-1024
MLKEM512X25519NamedGroupML-KEM-512
SecP256r1MLKEM512NamedGroupML-KEM-512
ML-KEM-only key exchange
MLKEM512NamedGroupML-KEM-512
MLKEM768NamedGroupML-KEM-768
MLKEM1024NamedGroupML-KEM-1024
HQC key agreement
HQCKEM128NamedGroupHQC-1
HQCKEM192NamedGroupHQC-3
HQCKEM256NamedGroupHQC-5
HQCKEM192X25519NamedGroupHQC-3
HQCKEM256X448NamedGroupHQC-5
HQCKEM192MLKEM768NamedGroupHQC-3 + ML-KEM-768
HQCKEM256MLKEM1024NamedGroupHQC-5 + ML-KEM-1024
HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519NamedGroupHQC-3 + ML-KEM-768
HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448NamedGroupHQC-5 + ML-KEM-1024
Signatures
mldsa44SignatureSchemeML-DSA-44
mldsa65SignatureSchemeML-DSA-65
mldsa87SignatureSchemeML-DSA-87
Hybrid SCloud+ key exchange
X25519SCloud+128NamedGroupSCloud+-128
SecP256r1SCloud+192NamedGroupSCloud+-192
SecP384r1SCloud+256NamedGroupSCloud+-256
Hybrid SM2-MLKEM key exchange
curveSM2MLKEM768NamedGroupML-KEM-768

Post-quantum specifications

Hybrid key exchange

RFC 9954 defines the general framework for hybrid key exchange, and RFC 10024 defines the three hybrid groups X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024.

  • RFC 9954Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3Post-quantum specificationIETFPublishedJul 15, 2026
  • RFC 10024Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3Post-quantum specificationIETFPublishedAug 10, 2026

Additional hybrid groups

Individual drafts following the RFC 9954 framework define extra hybrid groups. MLKEM1024X448 combines ML-KEM-1024 with X448 for AES-256-level security. MLKEM512X25519 and SecP256r1MLKEM512 use ML-KEM-512 to reduce ClientHello fragmentation and constrained-device overhead, at a lower security level than the mainstream groups. None are adopted by the working group.

ML-KEM-only key exchange

Approved by the IESG and awaiting publication as an RFC. Defines the groups MLKEM512, MLKEM768 and MLKEM1024, which contain no classical algorithm and mainly serve environments with compliance requirements.

  • draft-ietf-tls-mlkemML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3Post-quantum specificationIETFApproved, awaiting publicationSep 3, 2026

HQC key agreement

An individual draft defines standalone HQC groups and combinations with traditional algorithms and ML-KEM for TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3 and QUIC.

Signatures

The ML-DSA signature schemes are approved by the IESG and awaiting publication as an RFC. Defines the signature schemes mldsa44, mldsa65 and mldsa87.

  • draft-ietf-tls-mldsaUse of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3Post-quantum specificationIETFApproved, awaiting publicationSep 10, 2026

Hybrid SCloud+ key exchange

An individual draft defines X25519SCloud+128, SecP256r1SCloud+192 and SecP384r1SCloud+256 for TLS 1.3. Group code points remain unassigned in the draft.

Composite ML-DSA signatures

Combines ML-DSA with RSA-PSS, ECDSA or EdDSA into single signature schemes for TLS 1.3 authentication and certificates, so either component still holds if the other breaks.

KEM authentication

An individual draft uses KEMs for TLS 1.3 authentication and requires protocol extensions.

External pre-shared keys

RFC 9973 combines certificate authentication with an external PSK. A strong PSK provides additional long-term confidentiality, subject to secure generation and distribution.

  • RFC 9973TLS 1.3 Extension for Using Certificates with an External Pre-Shared KeyPost-quantum specificationIETFPublishedJul 2026

Extended key update

A working group draft introduces fresh key exchanges into existing TLS and DTLS 1.3 connections, including negotiated post-quantum and hybrid groups.

Handshake optimization

Working group drafts cover DNS hints for key-share selection and Merkle Tree Certificates. The individual CA certificate suppression proposal has expired.

Historical documents

Hybrid SM2-MLKEM key exchange

Combines ECDHE on the SM2 curve with ML-KEM-768 as curveSM2MLKEM768 for TLS 1.3 key establishment; the proposal has stopped progressing.

SLH-DSA signatures

Introduces SLH-DSA stateless hash-based signatures into TLS 1.3 and evaluates handshake overhead from large signatures; the proposal has stopped progressing.

External pre-shared keys

RFC 9973 combines certificate authentication with an external PSK. A strong PSK provides additional long-term confidentiality, subject to secure generation and distribution.

  • RFC 8773TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared KeyPost-quantum specificationIETFReplacedMar 2020
  • draft-vanrein-tls-kdhQuantum Relief with TLS and KerberosPost-quantum specificationIETFExpiredApr 24, 2023

Handshake optimization

Working group drafts cover DNS hints for key-share selection and Merkle Tree Certificates. The individual CA certificate suppression proposal has expired.

Kyber hybrid key exchange drafts

These individual Kyber drafts have expired and identify early implementations. See hybrid key exchange for standardized ML-KEM schemes.

Key exchange, certificate signatures and connection key updates serve distinct roles. Hybrid key exchange protects session-key establishment; authentication also depends on certificates and signature schemes. Long-term confidentiality from the external PSK extension depends on PSK secrecy, entropy and distribution.

Further reading

  • AWS

    Research

    How to tune TLS for hybrid post-quantum cryptography with Kyber

    Handshake and request latency experiments show how connection pooling, idle timeouts, and TLS session resumption amortize the cost of hybrid post-quantum TLS. A useful engineering reference for performance analysis and tuning, with experiments and configuration reflecting the versions available at publication.

  • Cloudflare

    Research

    Sizing Up Post-Quantum Signatures

    By adding data to certificate chains, Cloudflare measures TLS handshake success rates and latency, examining the effects of large signatures, public keys, TCP's initial congestion window, and client compatibility. Useful for assessing the message overhead of post-quantum authentication; experiments and candidate algorithm discussions reflect the 2021 context.

    • Signatures