Hybrid key exchange
RFC 9954 defines the general framework for hybrid key exchange, and RFC 10024 defines the three hybrid groups X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024.
Standardization progress of post-quantum key exchange and signatures in TLS 1.3.
| Identifier | Kind | Uses |
|---|---|---|
| Hybrid key exchange | ||
| X25519MLKEM768 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-768 |
| SecP256r1MLKEM768 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-768 |
| SecP384r1MLKEM1024 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-1024 |
| Additional hybrid groups | ||
| MLKEM1024X448 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-1024 |
| MLKEM512X25519 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-512 |
| SecP256r1MLKEM512 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-512 |
| ML-KEM-only key exchange | ||
| MLKEM512 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-512 |
| MLKEM768 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-768 |
| MLKEM1024 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-1024 |
| HQC key agreement | ||
| HQCKEM128 | NamedGroup | HQC-1 |
| HQCKEM192 | NamedGroup | HQC-3 |
| HQCKEM256 | NamedGroup | HQC-5 |
| HQCKEM192X25519 | NamedGroup | HQC-3 |
| HQCKEM256X448 | NamedGroup | HQC-5 |
| HQCKEM192MLKEM768 | NamedGroup | HQC-3 + ML-KEM-768 |
| HQCKEM256MLKEM1024 | NamedGroup | HQC-5 + ML-KEM-1024 |
| HQCKEM192MLKEM768X25519 | NamedGroup | HQC-3 + ML-KEM-768 |
| HQCKEM256MLKEM1024X448 | NamedGroup | HQC-5 + ML-KEM-1024 |
| Signatures | ||
| mldsa44 | SignatureScheme | ML-DSA-44 |
| mldsa65 | SignatureScheme | ML-DSA-65 |
| mldsa87 | SignatureScheme | ML-DSA-87 |
| Hybrid SCloud+ key exchange | ||
| X25519SCloud+128 | NamedGroup | SCloud+-128 |
| SecP256r1SCloud+192 | NamedGroup | SCloud+-192 |
| SecP384r1SCloud+256 | NamedGroup | SCloud+-256 |
| Hybrid SM2-MLKEM key exchange | ||
| curveSM2MLKEM768 | NamedGroup | ML-KEM-768 |
RFC 9954 defines the general framework for hybrid key exchange, and RFC 10024 defines the three hybrid groups X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024.
Individual drafts following the RFC 9954 framework define extra hybrid groups. MLKEM1024X448 combines ML-KEM-1024 with X448 for AES-256-level security. MLKEM512X25519 and SecP256r1MLKEM512 use ML-KEM-512 to reduce ClientHello fragmentation and constrained-device overhead, at a lower security level than the mainstream groups. None are adopted by the working group.
Approved by the IESG and awaiting publication as an RFC. Defines the groups MLKEM512, MLKEM768 and MLKEM1024, which contain no classical algorithm and mainly serve environments with compliance requirements.
An individual draft defines standalone HQC groups and combinations with traditional algorithms and ML-KEM for TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3 and QUIC.
The ML-DSA signature schemes are approved by the IESG and awaiting publication as an RFC. Defines the signature schemes mldsa44, mldsa65 and mldsa87.
An individual draft defines X25519SCloud+128, SecP256r1SCloud+192 and SecP384r1SCloud+256 for TLS 1.3. Group code points remain unassigned in the draft.
Combines ML-DSA with RSA-PSS, ECDSA or EdDSA into single signature schemes for TLS 1.3 authentication and certificates, so either component still holds if the other breaks.
An individual draft uses KEMs for TLS 1.3 authentication and requires protocol extensions.
RFC 9973 combines certificate authentication with an external PSK. A strong PSK provides additional long-term confidentiality, subject to secure generation and distribution.
A working group draft introduces fresh key exchanges into existing TLS and DTLS 1.3 connections, including negotiated post-quantum and hybrid groups.
Working group drafts cover DNS hints for key-share selection and Merkle Tree Certificates. The individual CA certificate suppression proposal has expired.
Combines ECDHE on the SM2 curve with ML-KEM-768 as curveSM2MLKEM768 for TLS 1.3 key establishment; the proposal has stopped progressing.
Introduces SLH-DSA stateless hash-based signatures into TLS 1.3 and evaluates handshake overhead from large signatures; the proposal has stopped progressing.
RFC 9973 combines certificate authentication with an external PSK. A strong PSK provides additional long-term confidentiality, subject to secure generation and distribution.
Working group drafts cover DNS hints for key-share selection and Merkle Tree Certificates. The individual CA certificate suppression proposal has expired.
These individual Kyber drafts have expired and identify early implementations. See hybrid key exchange for standardized ML-KEM schemes.
Key exchange, certificate signatures and connection key updates serve distinct roles. Hybrid key exchange protects session-key establishment; authentication also depends on certificates and signature schemes. Long-term confidentiality from the external PSK extension depends on PSK secrecy, entropy and distribution.
AWS
Handshake and request latency experiments show how connection pooling, idle timeouts, and TLS session resumption amortize the cost of hybrid post-quantum TLS. A useful engineering reference for performance analysis and tuning, with experiments and configuration reflecting the versions available at publication.
Cloudflare
By adding data to certificate chains, Cloudflare measures TLS handshake success rates and latency, examining the effects of large signatures, public keys, TCP's initial congestion window, and client compatibility. Useful for assessing the message overhead of post-quantum authentication; experiments and candidate algorithm discussions reflect the 2021 context.