Policy & regulation
Post-quantum policies and guidance from governments and international bodies, grouped by region and document type, with scope, requirements and key dates.
Regional migration timelines
| Region | Inventory & planning | Priority migration | Further targets |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong, China Authorized Institutions in the banking sector | Inventory & planning Establish board governance and accountability, build a cryptographic inventory (CBOM), assess quantum exposure and document a multi-year migration roadmap | Priority migration Conduct controlled pilots to validate interoperability, rollback mechanisms and cryptographic agility, prioritising long-lived sensitive data and critical systems | Further targets 2030 Execute prioritised migration at scale and embed PQC readiness into business-as-usual governance, targeting full sectoral preparedness (QPI score of 10) |
| United States Federal non-national-security systems | Inventory & planning By October 22, 2026 Submit agency migration plans; advance cryptographic discovery, risk assessment and planning during 2026–2027 | Priority migration By January 2, 2030 Support TLS 1.3 or a successor version as soon as practicable to enable PQC key establishment; protocol support alone does not complete PQC migration 2030 High value assets, high impact systems and other highly sensitive systems migrate key establishment 2031 Those priority systems migrate digital signatures | Further targets 2035 Migrate remaining systems, considering risk assessments and commercial availability |
| United States National Security Systems (NSS) | Inventory & planning By May 4, 2023 Identify and document quantum-vulnerable cryptography, report the inventory to NSA and keep it updated[1] | Priority migration From 2027 New cryptographic products and services must include CNSA 2.0 algorithms, subject to public exceptions and approved waivers[2] 2030 Phase out and replace equipment and services that cannot or will not be updated to CNSA 2.0, subject to exceptions and waivers[2] | Further targets 2031 CNSA 2.0 algorithms are mandatory for all protocol use, subject to public exceptions and approved waivers[2] 2035 Overall transition goal under NSM-10; specific system classes may follow separately published timelines[2] |
| European Union EU Member States and critical infrastructure | Inventory & planning 2026 Establish national roadmaps and initiate planning and pilots for high- and medium-risk use cases | Priority migration 2030 Complete high-risk migration and enable quantum-safe software and firmware upgrades by default | Further targets 2035 Complete medium-risk migration and as much low-risk migration as feasible by year-end |
| United Kingdom Critical infrastructure, large organisations and regulated financial firms | Inventory & planning 2028 Define migration goals, complete discovery and build an initial migration plan | Priority migration 2031 Complete the highest-priority migrations | Further targets 2035 Complete migration of all systems |
| Germany Public administrations, critical infrastructure and businesses | Inventory & planning 2026 Complete initial cryptographic inventory and migration planning, assign responsibilities and begin migration by year-end | Priority migration 2030 Complete quantum-safe migration of high-risk use cases by year-end | Further targets 2035 Complete medium-risk migration and migrate as many remaining systems as possible by year-end |
| Canada Non-classified federal IT systems and relevant cloud services | Inventory & planning By April 2026 Establish initial departmental migration plans and begin annual progress reporting | Priority migration 2031 Complete migration of high-priority systems by year-end | Further targets 2035 Complete migration of remaining systems by year-end |
| Australia Organisations applying the Information Security Manual (ISM) | Inventory & planning 2026 Refine the transition plan around security goals, risk tolerance, dependencies and data value by year-end | Priority migration 2028 Begin migration by year-end, prioritising critical systems, long-lived sensitive data and systems that are difficult to upgrade | Further targets 2030 Complete the PQC transition and cease use of traditional asymmetric cryptography by year-end |
| Singapore Financial institutions | Inventory & planning 2027 Develop a board- or senior management-approved migration plan by year-end; CIIOs, DSIBs and NETS to submit plans to MAS by 30 June 2027 | Priority migration 2030 Complete migration of critical systems by year-end; CIIOs to migrate critical information infrastructure systems by the end of 2029 | Further targets 2034 Complete migration of remaining systems by year-end, documenting deviations and interim controls |
| Singapore Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) and organisations | Inventory & planning 2027 Establish a migration plan, assess quantum risks and identify priority systems and accountable owners by year-end | Priority migration 2031 Complete migration of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) systems; prioritise long-lived sensitive data, internet-facing systems and long-lifespan equipment | Further targets 2035 Aim to complete migration of remaining systems exposed to quantum risks |
| Japan Government agency information systems | Inventory & planning Fiscal year 2026 Establish the government PQC roadmap to guide cryptographic inventories and agency migration plans | Priority migration Migrate systems handling highly sensitive or long-lived confidential information earlier against harvest-now-decrypt-later risks | Further targets 2035 Complete the transition of government information systems to PQC in principle |
| India Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), other government entities and private enterprises | Inventory & planning 2027 Establish governance, inventory cryptographic assets, assess quantum risks and launch pilots across CII 2028 Complete foundational work, cryptographic inventories and pilots across other government entities and private enterprises | Priority migration 2028 Migrate high-priority CII systems, upgrade PKI, HSMs, KMS and cryptographic libraries, and adopt PQC-capable digital signatures 2030 Migrate high-priority systems in other government entities and private enterprises, with supplier accountability and continuous monitoring | Further targets 2029 Achieve full PQC or hybrid adoption across CII, with long-term governance and auditing 2033 Achieve full PQC or hybrid adoption across other government entities and private enterprises, with long-term governance and auditing |
| Switzerland Supervised financial institutions | Inventory & planning By June 2027 Develop a PQC roadmap based on a board-approved strategy, supported by business-process risk analysis and a continuously updated cryptographic inventory | Priority migration Migrate critical business processes by the roadmap’s target date and prioritise protecting long-lived sensitive data, including through hybrid schemes | Further targets Complete full quantum-safe migration by the roadmap’s target date, embedding cryptographic agility and third-party provider requirements |
| Saudi Arabia Regulated financial institutions | Inventory & planning 2026 Ensure accurate and comprehensive identification and classification procedures for all cryptographic assets by year-end, assessing migration priorities and third-party dependencies By March 2027 Complete an enterprise-level quantum risk assessment and develop action plans for the identified risks | Priority migration Develop and implement plans to achieve the required cryptographic resilience or alternative solutions for all priority assets | Further targets Execute enterprise-wide risk action plans and maintain periodic oversight of quantum risks through board-level information security and risk committees |
Documents
China
Global call for next-generation commercial cryptography algorithms
ICCS launches a global collection of public-key, hash and block-cipher algorithms, addressing the impact of quantum computing on commercial cryptography and selecting algorithms for standardization through multiple evaluation rounds.
Hong Kong, China
Quantum Preparedness of Hong Kong’s Banking Sector
HKMA whitepaper for Authorized Institutions setting out a four-stage transition across Awareness, Planning, Pilot and Practical Preparedness. Recommends cryptographic inventories, quantum risk assessment, controlled pilots, vendor governance and cryptographic agility, targeting full banking-sector readiness (a Quantum Preparedness Index score of 10) by 2030.
United States
Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (NIST IR 8547)
NIST's final standards transition plan deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows their use for new digital signatures and key establishment under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035. Continued use during deprecation requires risk assessment and does not extend the earlier migration deadlines for priority federal systems under OMB M-26-15.
Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (OMB M-26-15)
Requires US federal agencies to submit migration plans by October 22, 2026 for non-national-security systems. High value assets, high impact systems and other highly sensitive systems must migrate key establishment by 2030 and digital signatures by 2031; remaining systems follow by 2035 based on risk and commercial availability. Agencies must support TLS 1.3 or a successor version as soon as practicable, but no later than January 2, 2030.
Use of Public Standards for Secure Information Sharing (CNSSP 15)
The version released in 2025 approves CNSA 2.0 algorithms and parameters for National Security Systems (NSS). It requires CNSA 2.0 in new cryptographic products and services from 2027, replacement of equipment and services that cannot or will not be updated by 2030, and CNSA 2.0 for all protocol use by 2031, subject to public exceptions and approved waivers. The link is NSA's official entry point for the updated policy.
Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography
Joint guidance from CISA, NSA, and NIST encouraging organizations, especially critical infrastructure operators, to establish migration roadmaps, inventory cryptography in IT and OT systems, and assess risks based on data protection lifetimes and business impact. Includes recommendations for vendor engagement, procurement, and supply chain readiness.
Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act (Public Law 117-260)
Requires OMB to issue post-quantum cryptography migration guidance and report progress to Congress, and federal agencies to maintain inventories of quantum-vulnerable IT, prioritize migration, and develop migration plans. Applies to non-national-security systems of federal agencies within the Act's scope.
Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0)
NSA guidance for National Security Systems (NSS) owners, operators and vendors covering public cryptographic algorithms, software and firmware signing, product validation and phased adoption. It applies to both classified and unclassified NSS. This document is the September 2022 edition; consult CNSSP 15, released in 2025, for current algorithm parameters and mandatory deadlines.
Quantum Computing Leadership and Migration to Quantum-Resistant Cryptography (NSM-10)
Sets the overall goal of mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by 2035. Agencies operating National Security Systems (NSS) must identify and document uses of quantum-vulnerable cryptography by May 4, 2023, report them to NSA and develop annually updated migration plans.
European Union
A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography
NIS Cooperation Group recommendations for EU Member States to migrate high-risk use cases by the end of 2030, medium-risk use cases by the end of 2035, and low-risk use cases as far as feasible by 2035. Covers cryptographic assets, supply chains and preparation for quantum-safe updates.
United Kingdom
Act now to be resilient in the quantum future
FCA statement for UK regulated financial firms aligning with NCSC migration timelines: complete a PQC migration plan by 2028, carry out high-priority migrations by 2031, and migrate all systems, services and products by 2035. Expects firms to inventory cryptography, set risk-based objectives, validate changes and allocate sufficient senior management resources.
Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography
UK NCSC guidance for organisations of all kinds, targeting discovery and initial planning by 2028, high-priority migration by 2031, and migration of all systems, services and products by 2035.
Germany
National Implementation of the EU Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography
Joint BSI, BMI and BMDS guidance for public administrations, critical infrastructure operators and businesses. Recommends initial inventory and planning with migration begun by the end of 2026, high-risk migration by the end of 2030, and medium-risk migration plus as many remaining systems as possible by the end of 2035.
Canada
Roadmap for the migration to post-quantum cryptography for the Government of Canada (ITSM.40.001)
A roadmap for non-classified Canadian federal IT systems, including relevant contracted cloud services. Recommends migrating high-priority systems by the end of 2031 and remaining systems by the end of 2035, with departmental planning and annual progress reporting.
Australia
Post-Quantum Questions to Ask Your Vendors
Joint ASD, CISA and NSA guidance (November 2026 edition) providing vendor-neutral questions for procurement, contract renewals and vendor assurance. Covers cryptographic dependency inventories (CBOMs), risk assessment, system triage, PQC implementation and vendor communication, including whether firmware can support post-quantum signatures without hardware replacement and whether vendors commit to PQC-ready releases before the end of 2030.
Planning for post-quantum cryptography
ASD guidance for organisations applying the Information Security Manual (September 2025 revision). Recommends refining migration plans by the end of 2026, starting migration with critical systems and data by the end of 2028, and completing the PQC transition by the end of 2030.
Singapore
Financial Sector Quantum-Safe Migration Guidance and Timelines (Consultation Paper P019-2026)
MAS consultation paper proposing supervisory expectations for financial institutions in Singapore. Covers governance, cryptographic inventories and tested implementation, expecting firms to develop migration plans by the end of 2027, migrate critical systems by the end of 2030 and complete remaining migrations by the end of 2034. CIIOs, DSIBs and NETS must submit plans to MAS by 30 June 2027, and CIIOs must migrate CII systems by the end of 2029.
Advisory on Quantum-Safe Migration for Organisations
CSA guidance encouraging organisations exposed to quantum risks to establish migration plans by the end of 2027, prioritise long-lived sensitive data, internet-facing systems and long-lifespan equipment, and complete migration by 2035. Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) follows separate guidance targeting migration by 2031.
Japan
Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in Government Agencies — Interim Report
Policy for government information systems covered by Japan’s common cybersecurity standards. Plans to establish a government roadmap in fiscal year 2026 to guide cryptographic inventories and agency plans, targeting migration in principle by 2035 while considering earlier transition for systems handling highly sensitive or long-lived information.
India
Roadmap to Quantum Resiliency: Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India
India's Department of Science and Technology proposes this National Quantum Mission roadmap, recommending CII foundations in 2027, high-priority migration in 2028 and full PQC or hybrid adoption in 2029; other government entities and private enterprises have targets of 2028, 2030 and 2033. It also recommends national PQC testing and certification; binding obligations depend on competent authorities and sectoral regulators.
Switzerland
FINMA Guidance 05/2026 — Quantum computing
FINMA guidance for supervised financial institutions recommending a board-approved PQC roadmap by June 2027 at the latest, setting target dates for both critical business processes and complete migration. Covers continuously updated cryptographic inventories, priority protection for long-lived sensitive data, and cryptographic agility in procurement and outsourcing.
Saudi Arabia
Enhancement of Operational Resilience to Address Quantum Computing Risks (SAMA 482021280)
Mandatory circular requiring regulated financial institutions to ensure accurate and comprehensive cryptographic asset identification and classification procedures by the end of 2026, and complete enterprise-level quantum risk assessments with action plans by March 2027. Requires resilience plans for all priority assets and periodic board-committee oversight of quantum risks.